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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we compare gender differences in the allocation of time to market work, 
domestic work, child care, and leisure over the life cycle. Time use profiles for these 
activity categories are constructed on survey data for three countries: Australia, the UK 
and Germany.  We discuss the extent to which gender differences and life cycle variation 
in time use can be explained by public policy, focusing on the tax treatment of the female 
partner and on access to high quality, affordable child care.  Profiles of time use, earnings 
and taxes are compared over the life cycle defined on age as well as on phases that 
represent the key transitions in the life cycle of a typical household. Our contention is 
that, given the decision to have children, life cycle time use and consumption decisions of 
households are determined by them and by public policy. Before children arrive, the adult 
members of the household have high labour supplies and plenty of leisure. The presence 
of pre-school children, in combination with the tax treatment of the second earner’s 
income and the cost of bought-in child care, dramatically change the pattern of time use, 
leading to large falls in female labour supply. We also highlight the fact that, in the three 
countries we study, female labour supply exhibits a very high degree of heterogeneity 
after the arrival of children, and we show that this has important implications for public 
policy. 
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I. Introduction 
The inverse association between female labour force participation (FLP) and the total 
fertility rate (TFR) appears to be a strong empirical regularity.1 Increasing wages and job 
opportunities for women seem to have led to growth in participation rates and declining 
family size in virtually all developed countries.2  In this paper we use time use survey 
data for three countries, Australia, Germany and the UK, to look in greater depth at 
female labour supply, and at the allocation of time between market work, household work 
and child care over the life cycle.  Our concern is that while participation and fertility 
rates in these countries appear to be strongly negatively associated over time, on average 
the increase in the time women supply to the labour market does not appear to have 
matched the fall in the demand for domestic labour that might be expected to follow the 
large falls in fertility. Why, given the significant falls in fertility, has female labour 
supply not risen to much higher levels?  It should also be emphasized that these 
movements in data averages conceal very high variation in female labour supply changes 
across households, with a large proportion of women continuing to work virtually full 
time while a similarly large proportion leave the labour force. How do we explain this 
heterogeneity and what are its policy implications? 
 
The explanation we suggest is that the design of public policy in the areas of taxation, 
social security and child care creates serious disincentives to female market work, 
particularly when the children are young. The tax treatment of the family effectively 
penalises the female partner as, typically, the second earner, and this, together with 
certain types of market failure that we discuss in the paper, has the result that many 
women supply little or no time to the market while others work full time. We believe that 
it is quite possible to change policy in a given country in such a way as to increase both 
female labour supply and fertility, thus reversing the historically negative association. 
 
                                                          
1 For recent empirical studies confirming the negative time-series association between the TFR and FLP, 
see Engelhardt, Kögel and Prskawetz (2004) and Kögel (2004).   
2 For a theoretical model linking an inverse association between the FLP and TFR to a rising female wage, 
see Galor and Weil (1996). 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section II begins with cross-country comparisons of 
TFRs and participation and employment rates from 1970 to 2000, based on aggregate 
OECD data. One aim of the paper is to use the more detailed time use data to deepen 
considerably our understanding of the relationship between female labour supply and 
fertility. We then describe the time use and other survey data we use in the remainder of 
the paper, and set out the theoretical framework underlying the main aspects of our 
empirical approach. Section III goes on to analyse detailed evidence on the age profiles 
of female and male time allocations for each of the three countries. Separate profiles are 
presented for households with and without children, in order to identify the time use 
effects of children.  
 
Section IV presents labour supply profiles for couples and shows first that the fall in 
female labour supply is associated with an increase in female time allocated to household 
production, in particular to child care. To bring out more clearly the full effect of children 
on market versus domestic time allocation decisions, we then define the life cycle3 on the 
presence and ages of children, rather than simply on the age of the male partner, as is 
usual in the life cycle literature. This allows us to capture more effectively the key 
transitions in the life cycle of the typical household and to bring out more clearly how the 
demands of children affect the allocation of female time under existing government 
policies. We then examine the contribution of female earnings to private household 
incomes over the life cycle and the effects of taxes and benefits for two of the three 
countries, Australia and the UK, using household expenditure survey data. 
 
In section V we emphasise the importance of the heterogeneity of households in respect 
of the female’s allocation of time to market and household work.  To help explain the 
data, we classify households into two groups: those with low and those with relatively 
high female market labour supplies. We show how the tax and benefit policies in the 
countries concerned can result in a substantial redistribution of income from the latter to 
                                                          
3 We should make clear that in the empirical work, because we have only cross section data, our “life 
cycle” is a synthetic construct, based on data for households at different points in their own life cycles at a 
given point in time. We thus ignore cohort effects.  However, for the comparisons we wish to make in this 
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the former, which explains, at least in part, why female labour supplies are markedly low 
on average, once the household has children. We conclude the paper in Section VI with a 
discussion of the implications of our findings for public policy. 
 
II Time allocation and fertility: evidence and theory  
 
(i) Fertility, labour supply and public policy 
 
Table 1 shows that Australia, the UK and Germany experienced steadily declining 
fertility rates from 1970 to 2000, and sharply increasing female labour force participation 
rates, particularly in the first two decades. However unemployment rates also rose over 
the period, giving lower employment rates. More importantly, the female part-time 
employment rate increased more rapidly than the full-time rate, which has remained  
 
Table 1:   Fertility, participation and employment rates*, 1970-2000 
Year  1970 1980 1990 1997 2000 
Australia       
TFRa  2.86 1.90 1.91 1.78 1.75 
Female participation rate %  46.50 52.70 62.10 63.60 66.10 
Female employment rate %  44.20 45.20 55.00 55.50 60.20 
Female full-time employment rate %  ** 29.43 33.83 32.74 35.70 
Male participation rate %  93.70 87.60 85.80 83.90 84.70 
Male full-time employment rate %  ** 76.18 69.98 64.31 66.63 
UK       
TFRa  2.43 1.90 1.83 1.72 1.64 
Female participation rate %  50.70 58.30 66.50 67.10 67.70 
Female employment rate  49.80 54.10 60.00 61.40 62.90 
Female full-time employment rate %  ** 32.41b 36.30 36.23 37.24 
Male participation rate %  94.40 90.50 87.20 83.20 82.80 
Male full-time employment rate %  ** 81.04b 75.85 68.85 69.46 
Germany       
TFRa  2.03 1.56 1.45 1.37 1.36 
Female participation rate %  48.10 52.80 56.70 62.50 63.70 
Female employment rate  47.50 48.50 50.90 51.90 55.60 
Female full-time employment rate %  ** 33.37b 35.73 35.60 36.75 
Male participation rate %  92.50 84.30 82.20 80.30 79.80 
Male full-time employment rate %  ** 79.98b 76.30 67.99 68.73 
*% of population aged 15-64 years. ** Data not available. 
(a) TFR: Average number of children a woman would expect to have if she were to experience all of the 
age-specific birth rates occurring in that year. (b) 1983 full-time employment rate (1980 not available).  
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
paper, we do not believe that these effects are so strong as to invalidate the conclusions we draw. This is 
further discussed below. 
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around half the male rate in each country.  These figures suggest that female labour 
supply has not risen at a rate that comes near to matching the rate of decline in the TFR.    
 
Though the inverse association between fertility and female participation within a 
country seems quite marked, across the countries the relationship tends to be positive, 
and indeed this is very much the case for the whole group of OECD countries.4 For 
example, Denmark, France and Sweden now have substantially higher FLPs and TFRs 
than Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands.  Nevertheless, as recent empirical 
studies show, 5 the time-series association within the OECD countries has remained 
negative.6
 
The persistence of a negative time-series correlation within countries does not, however, 
prove that the trade-off between the choices of fertility and female labour supply is 
inevitably negative.  A result of this kind can, of course, be derived from a model that 
imposes conventional gender roles within the family. For example, Galor and Weil 
(1996) assume that the only source of child care is the mother’s time, to obtain this result. 
However, when bought-in child care is also an input and can substitute for parental time, 
as in Apps and Rees (2004), the TFR and FLP can vary positively with each other under 
quite plausible assumptions.  In particular, we show that policies that reduce the price of 
bought-in quality child care and raise the female net wage can lead to an increase in both 
fertility and female labour supply.   
  
More specifically, we would argue that factors such as: the structure of the tax and social 
security systems, as they impact on working women of child bearing age; the availability 
of good quality and affordable child care; and organisation of the school system, have an 
important effect on the terms of the trade-off between allocating time to the market and to 
domestic child care.  
 
                                                          
4 See Apps and Rees (2004) and Kögel (2004). 
5 See Engelhardt and Prskawetz (2002), Engelhardt, Kögel and Prskawetz (2004) and Kögel (2004). 
6 An exception is the US, which draws heavily on low wage, unskilled workers as a source of labour supply 
for child care. See Martinez and Iza (2004). 
 4
To give some indication of the possible effects of these factors, in what follows we first 
construct female and male life cycle profiles of labour supply, domestic work and child 
care. The profiles highlight the very dramatic substitution of domestic for market work by 
the female partner that still prevails after the arrival of children, despite declining family 
size, and the high degree of heterogeneity in female market hours across seemingly 
similar households.  Using household expenditure survey data, we then go on to identify 
the way in which tax and social security policies can effectively tax the income of a 
working mother (as second earner) at a much higher rate than that of a single individual.  
 
Since Boskin and Sheshinki (1983) it has been recognised that basing a progressive tax 
on the joint income of couples has the effect of taxing the first dollar of the second earner 
at the same rate as the last dollar of the primary earner and, therefore, that individual 
taxation is superior on efficiency grounds, given available wage elasticity estimates.   
Less well understood are the policy implications of female labour supply heterogeneity 
across families in similar circumstances.  As we show in Apps and Rees (1999), an 
income tax is, in effect, a tax on market trade that a couple can partly avoid by having 
one partner switch from market work to the home production of substitutes, such as child 
care.  A key problem that arises is that, among two-parent families with the same wage 
rates, non-labour incomes and demographics, mothers (and occasionally fathers) make 
very different market/domestic work decisions.  Consequently, even under a flat rate 
income tax and a universal child benefit system, mothers of young children who work in 
the market effectively subsidise those in similar circumstances who withdraw from it.  
Under these conditions, individual taxation has the further advantage that the tax rate on 
working mothers can be reduced by increasing the progressivity of the marginal rate 
schedule.7   
 
Of the three countries we study, only Germany has an income tax that is formally a 
system of joint taxation.  Australia has a personal income tax that is nominally based on 
                                                          
7 In a discussion of family taxation, the OECD (2004) cites the “the principle of equal taxation of equal 
[household] income” as support for joint taxation on equity grounds. However, as shown in Apps and Rees 
(1999), this kind of argument ignores the policy implications of female labour supply heterogeneity and the 
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individual incomes.  In the UK, independent taxation was introduced in 1990, primarily 
in response to the view that it was inappropriate to treat a woman’s income as part of her 
husband’s income.8  However, neither Australia nor the UK can be said to have retained 
systems of independent taxation, broadly defined to include levies, tax credits and 
tax/cash benefits for dependent children.  Through a succession of reforms since the 
1980s, Australia has moved to a family tax-benefit system that imposes very high 
effective rates on the incomes of married mothers as second earners.  This has been 
achieved by replacing universal family allowances with an expanding system of tax 
benefits that are withdrawn on the basis of joint income or the income of the second 
earner.  The UK is in the process of moving in the same direction, with the introduction 
of tax credits based on family income and employment status.9  These reforms have 
effectively shifted a greater share of the tax burden to working mothers.  Moreover, there 
has been no commensurate increase in relief for the high cost of child care for working 
mothers and, in the case of Germany, no major change in the restrictive schedule of 
school hours that also imposes a constraint on female labour supply and domestic work 
choices.   
 
(ii)  Data  
 
Our construction of life cycle profiles of labour supply, domestic work and child care in 
the sections to follow draws on data from time use surveys for each of the three countries: 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 1997 Time Use Survey (TUS); the UK Office 
                                                                                                                                                                             
fact that households in which the mother withdraws from work avoids tax by substituting domestic for 
market output.  
8 For these arguments in support of independent taxation in the UK, and for a brief history of recent 
changes, see Adam (2004). 
9 Jaumotte (2003) ranks OECD countries according to the ratio of the effective tax rate faced by a second 
earner and the rate she would face as a single individual, for female earnings levels of 67 per cent and 100 
per cent of Average Production Worker earnings (APW) and the male level held at 100 per cent of APW, in 
2000-2001.  However, the ratios for these APWs may be unrepresentative because they may miss the high 
effective tax rates on second earners at lower earnings levels.  The result for Australia of 1.4, for example, 
is likely to be too low because in 2000 family tax benefits were withdrawn at 30 cents in the dollar, mostly 
at lower income levels.  Using unit record data for in-work families during 1999-2000, Apps (2002) finds 
that second earners in quintiles 1 and 2 of primary income faced the highest average tax rates.  More recent 
results show that average tax rates on second earners have since risen quite dramatically, to give ratios of 
2.5 and higher across almost the entire distribution of primary income. 
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of National Statistics (ONS) 2000 Time Use Survey; and the special topic module with 
questions on time use included in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) 
2000.  To obtain information on incomes and the tax treatment of couples, we select 
matching samples of couples from the ABS 1998 Household Expenditure Survey (HES) 
and the 2000-01 UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES).  While the GSOEP 2000 
includes information on incomes before and after tax, the data do not provide sufficient 
detail to allow the construction of life cycle tax profiles. 
 
The ABS 1997 TUS collected time use data by diary for ten activity episode 
classifications comprising market employment activities as a single category and nine 
non-market activity categories,10 for two diary days.  We compute market hours of work 
as the sum of time allocations to all subcategories of employment activities, including 
associated travel, job search and work breaks. Domestic work (including child care) is 
computed as the sum of time allocations to three non-market categories: domestic 
activities, purchasing goods and services and child care/minding.11 For each episode, 
information is recorded for a primary and, if relevant, a secondary activity. Where both 
are recorded, a weighting of 0.6:0.4 is applied to satisfy the time constraint. We select 
non-dependent adult records excluding only those with missing information for both 
diary days and a small number of difficult to classify records in complex households.  
This full sample of non-dependent adults contains 6160 records of which 2180 represent 
single persons and single parents.  
 
The ONS 2000 TUS collected time use data by diary for two diary days (one week day 
and one weekend day) and recorded primary and secondary activities for market and non-
market activity categories that closely match those of the Australian survey.   For 
consistency, UK market hours of work are computed as total time allocated to all 
employment activities, including travel to work, job search and breaks at work. Domestic 
work is calculated as the sum of time allocations to household tasks (including shopping), 
                                                          
10 The nine non-market activity episode classifications are: sleep and personal care, education, domestic 
activities, child care, purchasing goods and services, voluntary work and care, social and community 
interaction, active leisure and passive leisure. Associated travel is included within each category. 
11 In the ABS 1997 TUS, the activity categories include associated travel. 
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child care and associated travel, and we weight primary and secondary activities as above 
to satisfy the time constraint. We select a full sample of 7061 non-dependent adult 
records that matches as closely as possible the sample selected from the ABS TUS. The 
sample includes 2129 records representing single persons and lone parents.  
 
The GSOEP 2000 module collected information by questionnaire on usual hours of work 
and time spent on the following activities: employment (including travel to and from 
work), shopping for goods and services, housework, child care, education or further 
training, maintenance of house, garden or car repairs and hobbies and other free time 
activities.  The data were collected for a week day, a Saturday and a Sunday.  We 
compute time allocations to activities that match as far as possible those included in the 
categories of market work and domestic work in the ABS and ONS surveys. The full 
sample contains 9716 non-dependent adults, of which 2074 represent single persons and 
lone parents. 
 
The information on time use collected by questionnaire in the GSOEP 2000 is not as 
reliable as the diary data in the ABS 1997 and ONS 2000 surveys.  One limitation, which 
is common to questionnaire data, is the overstatement of hours of work.  Both market and 
domestic hours of work appear to be overstated in the GSOEP. A second problem is 
missing information on the primary/secondary status of activities.  This means that 
simultaneous activities cannot be identified and appropriately weighted to ensure the time 
constraint is satisfied.  As a consequence, an activity that is predominantly secondary, 
such as child care, can be seriously overstated. To reduce this problem, we have set the 
time constraint conservatively to 18 hours per day and scaled nonmarket activities to 
satisfy this constraint.  Nevertheless, it is clear that domestic work, and especially child 
care, remains overstated.  Thus caution needs to be exercised in making cross-country 
comparisons with Germany.    
 
 (iii) Implicit Model 
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The theoretical framework on which the empirical work presented in this paper is based 
draws primarily on the literature on the life cycle model, which can be interpreted in 
general terms as saying that the household chooses time paths of labour supply, 
consumption and saving over its entire lifetime, given its preferences and the prices, 
wages and interest rates it expects to face.12   Since the central concern of the paper is the 
comparison of female and male time allocations, and of how they change over time with 
family circumstances, it is important to extend the standard model to the case of two-
adult households in which time not spent in market work is not simply “leisure”, but 
rather is devoted to production of domestic goods and services, in particular, to child 
care. Briefly, we propose a model in which household choices of saving and consumption 
over time are driven by decisions on female labour supply, which in turn are strongly 
influenced by the number and ages of children in the household, given that child care and 
market work are close substitutes.13  While we extend the model in these respects, we 
nevertheless continue to use the convention of treating fertility as an exogenous variable, 
fully recognising of course the limitations of this assumption. 
 
The life cycle is necessarily dynamic: it refers to a process unfolding over time. 
Empirical observations would then ideally track a given set of households over time. 
However, for the purposes of this study we have available only cross-section data. To 
interpret a sequence of data values for households of increasing ages as depicting a “life 
cycle” then obviously encounters the difficulty that the characteristics of individuals born 
at different times, or of households first set up at different points of time, may differ 
significantly. Such “cohort effects” are obviously missing in a data set constructed at one 
point in time. However, we would suggest that the available evidence on cohort effects 
does not indicate that they are so strong, or that significant changes occur so rapidly, that 
all use of cross section data to draw inferences about life cycle behaviour is to be ruled 
out.14 Moreover, the focus of this study is not on comparisons between households whose 
                                                          
12 For surveys see Deaton (1992), Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Browning and Crossley (2001). 
13 For a formal treatment and further discussion of this model see Apps and Rees (2001). 
14 It is true that the percentage increases in the female hours of work of recent cohorts reported in some 
studies, especially those for the US, can appear to be quite large (see, for example, Pencavel, 1998, and 
Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos, 2003).  However, as we emphasise in this paper, the changes in 
absolute hours are often far less impressive, especially in the countries we consider here. 
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members are in their 20’s and 30’s and those in their 50’s and 60’s. That females in the 
former group for example may have larger market labour supplies than those in the latter 
when they arrive at age 50 is not the central issue. Rather, our main concerns are with 
households whose members are in their late 20’s to early 40’s, and here we would argue 
that cohort effects are far less likely to invalidate the conclusions we draw.  
 
III Life Cycle Labour Supplies – All Adults 
 
(i) Female and Male Labour Supplies by Age  
 
Table 2 presents data means for annual market hours of work and full-time employment 
rates by age and gender using the full samples for each of the three countries.15   The 
profiles are plotted in Figure 1. A common pattern is evident across the countries in the 
relationship between male and female hours of market work and the way in which these 
vary over the life cycle, defined on the individual’s age. The results show a very large 
gap between female and male labour supplies, with the shape of the female profiles 
showing clearly the impact of the presence of children in each age category.  As the 
percentage of households with children present declines, the differences between the 
labour supplies decrease, essentially because male hours fall more rapidly than female 
hours, until retirement age is reached.  The ratio of female to male hours of work at each 
age of work reflects very strongly the ratio of the female to male full-time employment 
rates. Overall, women under 65 years work around half the market hours of men under 65 
and they have a full-time employment rate that is also around half the male rate, which 
shows again that the gap between full-time employment rates, rather than participation 
rates, provides a more reliable indicator of gender differences in labour supply. 
 
In terms of cross-country comparisons, Australia has a more strongly U-shaped profile of 
female labour supply across the child rearing years than the UK and, of the three 
countries, the UK exhibits the smallest gap between male and female hours profiles. This 
                                                          
15 The data on time use are converted to an annual basis by weighting for the number of diary days and 
multiplying by days per year.   
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would seem to be consistent with the cross-country policy differences noted in the 
preceding section, and discussed in more detail in later sections. 
 
     Table 2 Labour supplies and full-time employment rates  
Australia                       Females                                                     Males 
 
Age 
 Market 
hours pa 
FT 
emp % 
% with 
children 
Cell 
size 
 Market 
hours pa 
FT 
emp % 
% with 
children 
Cell 
size  
<25  1307 55.2 14.9 341  1777 72.8 4.6 368 
25-29  1278 45.6 41.3 334  2159 76.0 21.6 307 
30-34  1007 36.0 71.8 347  2392 78.5 52.2 317 
35-39  1021 32.4 81.2 334  2247 77.6 64.8 329 
40-44  1020 33.9 72.2 333  2329 81.3 69.3 304 
45-49  1289 42.4 50.2 314  2189 84.5 55.3 324 
50-54  954 35.2 23.6 267  1981 74.9 40.1 225 
55-59  561 15.7 9.6 207  1605 61.8 17.1 188 
60-64  277 7.7 3.1 190  883 31.7 8.0 213 
65+  29 4.4 2.0 496  169 6.8 2.0 422 
<65  1021 36.1 44.3 2667  1989 72.8 37.6 2575 
UK                                 Females                                                     Males 
<25  987 31.8 23.7 320  1232 40.8 12.4 194 
25-29  1244 51.3 47.9 295  2046 82.1 25.8 250 
30-34  1161 49.8 66.9 438  2149 89.0 53.9 345 
35-39  1246 36.5 72.6 412  2267 86.7 63.1 368 
40-44  1201 41.0 69.6 364  2203 86.1 62.6 306 
45-49  1353 43.1 45.0 377  2169 86.0 51.1 323 
50-54  1199 44.1 17.1 356  1963 77.3 25.7 359 
55-59  798 19.8 5.0 291  1388 57.4 13.0 258 
60-64  249 5.1 2.1 231  932 32.7 3.3 222 
65+  28 0.6 0.2 764  86 3.0 0.9 584 
<65  1079 35.4 41.7 3084  1886 74.0 37.7 2625 
Germany                       Females                                                     Males 
<25  1424 48.1 33.3 162  1936 69.1 14.8 81 
25-29  1307 42.0 54.1 383  2399 79.5 40.6 254 
30-34  1211 37.7 76.7 600  2645 88.9 66.3 524 
35-39  1404 45.3 87.7 610  2618 89.0 79.5 589 
40-44  1510 41.2 71.4 583  2713 90.4 74.6 541 
45-49  1589 50.4 38.1 516  2542 88.2 50.0 451 
50-54  1472 47.2 14.1 405  2394 83.5 27.9 423 
55-59  1052 33.2 3.9 476  1830 64.4 11.5 477 
60-64  263 7.8 1.9 447  727 24.5 2.3 461 
65+  25 0.4 0 1013  76 1.7 0.3 720 
<65  1250 39.9 47.6 4182  2244 77.3 46.8 3801 
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Figure 1a:  Australia - labour supplies 
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Figure 1b: UK - labour supplies 
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Figure 1c: Germany - labour supplies 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
<25 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
Age
A
nn
ua
l h
ou
rs
 o
f w
or
k
Female labour
supply
Male labour
supply
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Female and Male Labour Supplies by Family Status 
 
While the profiles in Table 2 and Figure 1 suggest that the presence of young children has 
a very dramatic effect on female labour supply, nevertheless they do not isolate the effect 
very sharply, due to averaging over women in a particular age group, some of whom have 
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children and some who have not yet had children and are therefore continuing to work 
full time. To control for this, we compare female and male labour supply profiles across 
households with and without children.  Table 3 reports hours of work for females and 
males with and without children, up to the 50-54 age category.  Beyond this age there are 
very few households with children.  Figure 2 depicts the separate profiles to this age 
category, for each country, and shows graphically the very large gap between the labour 
supply of mothers and both of younger women without children and of men with and 
without children. 
 
Table 3:  Female and male labour supplies by family status   
 
 With children  Without children
Female Male  Female Male  
Age # deps Hours pa # deps  Hours pa  Hours pa Hours pa 
Australia 
<25 1.47 421 1.21 1943  1498 1720 
25-29 1.68 556 1.46 2222  1787 2132 
30-34 2.11 636 1.93 2382  1955 2403 
35-39 2.25 865 2.25 2296  1689 2101 
40-44 2.00 899 2.26 2394  1360 2184 
45-49 1.63 1259 1.80 2214  1318 2158 
50-54 1.47 1120 1.65 1916  903 2024 
<65 1.90 870 1.91 2203  1159 1833 
UK 
<25 1.37 492 1.18 1568  1327 1157 
25-29 1.67 700 1.51 2236  1839 1942 
30-34 1.97 856 1.75 2178  1775 2117 
35-39 2.06 1086 2.05 2382  1671 2069 
40-44 1.86 1093 2.03 2293  1450 2051 
45-49 1.52 1319 1.68 2134  1382 2207 
50-54 1.25 1298 1.48 2075  1179 1924 
<65 1.80 968 1.80 2148  1166 1712 
Germany 
<25 1.24 292 1.23 2108  2005 1903 
25-29 1.48 686 1.45 2626  2259 2234 
30-34 1.81 882 1.71 2678  2270 2587 
35-39 1.91 1264 1.94 2614  2410 2632 
40-44 1.72 1369 1.83 2736  1917 2639 
45-49 1.35 1323 1.60 2642  1770 2419 
50-54 1.27 1111 1.40 2484  1540 2357 
<65 1.70 1106 1.73 2621  1382 1912 
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Figure 2a:  Australlia - labour supplies by family status 
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Figure 2b:  UK - labour supplies by family status 
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Figure 2c:  Germany - labour supplies by family status 
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It is clear that the presence of children has on average a much larger effect on female 
labour supply in the early age groups.  In the younger age groups, women without 
children work a much higher percentage of male hours than women with children, 
especially in Germany.  In all three countries, the percentage of females with children 
reaches a maximum in the 35-39 age category.  From this point on, we cannot distinguish 
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between women whose children have left home and those who have never had children, 
although the large majority will of course have had children. 
 
Comparing Figures 1 and 2 we can see the extent to which the fall in female labour 
supply associated with the arrival of children is masked by age profiles that average 
across the two households groups, as in the life cycle literature.  Although Figure 1 shows 
a large gap between male and female labour supply profiles, the relevant gap from a 
policy perspective is that between females and males with children, which we can see 
from figure 2 is much larger.  Figure 2 also gives some indication of the extent to which 
the rise in the female participation rate is partly due to an increase in the proportion of 
women without children in the early age groups. This is a result of the postponement of 
the first child, especially in Australia, which may be driven to some extent by the 
anticipation of the high cost and poor availability of child care.   
 
IV Couples – Time Use and Incomes 
 
(i) Time Allocation by Age  
 
In the preceding tables, the data are averaged separately over the sample of women and 
the sample of men respectively.  From the point of view of behaviour however, clearly 
the decision taking unit is the household, which typically contains a couple.  We now 
analyse the time allocation decisions of couples and the effects of children.  Following 
convention, we begin by presenting life cycle labour supply profiles defined on the age of 
the male partner. Since there are very few male partners under 25, the first age category 
comprises the under 30 year-olds.  
 
Table 4 presents data means for the labour supplies of the household members, together 
with full-time employment rates and the percentage of couples with children in each age 
category. Figure 3 plots the labour supply profiles. Because the percentage of couples 
with children is higher than the percentage of the whole population with children, the gap 
between the female and male labour supply profiles is larger than in Figure 1.  Again the 
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size of the difference is largest in the age groups in which the children are very young.  In 
both the UK and Australia there is a noticeable dip in female labour supply after age 30, 
while in Germany, where there is a far higher percentage of the relatively small sample in 
the under 30 age group who have children, there is no dip, but labour supply starts off 
lower, before increasing as the children get older. 
  
Table 4:  Labour supplies and employment rates of couples  
 Female  Male  
Male age  Mkt hours  FT %  Mkt hours  FT % 
% with 
children  
Cell 
size 
Australia 
<30  1295 50.0  2305 90.8 39.6 186 
30-34  993 33.2  2448 89.6 73.0 224 
35-39  853 27.8  2365 84.0 86.0 252 
40-44  1093 33.5  2426 88.3 87.7 233 
45-49  1097 37.7  2241 88.4 64.7 269 
50-54  977 34.5  2037 79.0 46.6 188 
55-59  771 27.8  1770 68.7 21.9 144 
60-64  468 14.0  912 31.8 8.8 183 
65+  80 1.9  183 6.4 1.7 311 
<65  956 32.6  2098 78.9 56.9 1679 
UK 
<30  1395 52.6  2194 86.4 44.3 211 
30-34  1117 41.1  2176 92.4 68.9 288 
35-39  1116 37.4  2418 92.0 79.8 303 
40-44  1281 31.8  2331 91.0 78.0 251 
45-49  1336 41.8  2189 89.5 59.1 282 
50-54  1364 42.7  2106 83.2 30.7 296 
55-59  1058 28.1  1498 59.4 15.7 220 
60-64  513 16.0  1001 34.6 3.5 185 
65+  70 2.8  117 3.6 1.2 430 
<65  1163 36.9  2029 80.3 49.9 2036 
Germany 
<30  1102 34.4  2466 84.1 61.5 195 
30-34  1040 33.3  2708 92.4 79.3 420 
35-39  1135 32.8  2640 91.7 89.7 503 
40-44  1360 43.1  2758 92.5 86.4 469 
45-49  1374 38.4  2589 90.4 60.6 406 
50-54  1439 47.0  2465 85.1 33.2 370 
55-59  1131 33.4  1844 64.9 14.4 425 
60-64  710 22.1  745 24.7 2.6 416 
65+  231 6.6  68 1.5 0.3 617 
<65  1148 35.5  2277 78.3 54.6 3204 
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Figure 3a:  Australia - Labour supplies of couples 
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Figure 3b:  UK - Labour supplies of couples 
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Figure 3c:  Germany - Labour supplies of couples 
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Again we can see that the ratio of female to male market hours tracks the ratio of full 
time employment rates, in all three countries.  For couples in which the male partner is 
under 65 years, the female full-time employment rate is less than half the male rate and, 
apart from the UK, female market hours are less than 50 per cent of male hours.  In 
contrast, the ratio of female to male employment rates (full and part time) varies from 
around 70 to over 80 per cent. Australia records the lowest female full time employment 
rate and the lowest average female labour supply. 
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 The fall in female labour supply after the arrival of children reflects, of course, the fact 
that home production becomes a close substitute for market production, especially in 
countries with poorly developed child care sectors. Unfortunately, much of the theoretical 
and empirical work on labour supply and household decision taking over the life cycle 
has been based on the conventional model of the single individual consumer, who divides 
time solely between market work and leisure. This simple dichotomisation of time is not 
empirically relevant for the household with children, since the fall in female labour 
supply after the first child represents the substitution of domestic production, especially 
child care, for market output.  To show this, Table 5 presents age profiles of female and 
male domestic hours of work and child care.  The table also reports total hours of work. 
 
All three countries show hump-shaped profiles of time allocated to household production 
and child care, although there are dramatic differences, due primarily to differences in 
child care hours.  If we look at domestic work excluding child care, we can see that the 
Australian and UK profiles are very similar for both females and males.  They tend to rise 
with age, the female profile being around twice the height of the male profile in the early 
and middle age group.  The German profiles for both males and females are flatter, and 
the female profile is almost twice as high in the early and middle children years as the 
profiles for her counterparts in the UK and Australia.  We suggest this reflects the effect 
of collecting the data by questionnaire, and failing to account for the secondary status of 
at least some of the time reported as domestic work activity.  If we assume that male 
domestic hours are also overstated, then cross-country comparisons of the gap between 
the two profiles would suggest that men in Germany work fewer hours in the household 
than in the other two countries. 
 
The dramatic cross-country differences between child care hours appear to be due to 
variation in survey design and reporting. While the ABS and ONS diaries are very similar 
in design, Australian and UK respondents appear to vary in their reporting of child care, 
especially as a secondary activity.  The data indicate that UK respondents report child 
care less frequently as a secondary activity when a child is present and in the care of the 
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respondent even when the primary activity is, for example, travel or various home 
activities and the child is under 2 years of age.  This seems to account for the lower UK 
profiles for both partners, in comparison with the Australian profiles.  In contrast, 
German respondents tend to report child care as an activity whenever a child is present.  
Consequently, the child care profiles for Germany would appear to be far too high, 
especially for the female partner, and missing data on the primary/secondary status of 
activities exacerbates the problem, as already noted. 
 
Table 5 Domestic work and child care hours of couples  
 Female hours  Male hours  
Male 
Age 
 Domestic
+ c’care  
Child 
care   
Total hrs 
of work 
 Domestic 
+ c’care  
Child  
care  
Total hrs 
of work 
Australia 
<30  1741 748 3036  801 245 3151 
30-34  2767 1546 3760  1281 624 3729 
35-39  2881 1486 3734  1313 662 3618 
40-44  2498 1057 3591  1253 515 3679 
45-49  2002 477 3098  1007 236 3249 
50-54  1882 279 2859  941 119 2978 
55-59  1922 177 2693  1001 42 2770 
60-64  1793 132 2087  1176 72 2261 
65+  1732 63 1812  1364 26 1547 
<65  2219 779 3176  1107 337 3205 
UK   
<30  1690 706 3085  876 299 3069 
30-34  2180 1076 3297  1109 490 3286 
35-39  2252 993 3368  1027 454 3445 
40-44  2024 710 3306  1048 332 3379 
45-49  1770 406 3106  897 160 3086 
50-54  1533 146 2898  825 95 2931 
55-59  1588 150 2646  1002 104 2501 
60-64  1743 150 2256  1204 92 2204 
65+  1774 67 1844  1345 40 1464 
<65  1866 565 3028  996 264 3025 
Germany 
<30  3713 2042 4815  1404 767 3869 
30-34  3961 2354 5001  1492 943 4201 
35-39  3558 1899 4694  1528 960 4168 
40-44  2949 1176 4323  1187 609 3945 
45-49  2500 642 3778  861 252 3451 
50-54  2187 388 3626  675 105 3140 
55-59  2152 238 3283  707 65 2550 
60-64  2150 215 2860  792 56 1537 
65+  2303 152 2303  830 44 898 
<65  2869 1089 4017  1078 470 3353 
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 Figure 4a:  Australia - domestic work and child care hours
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
<30 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
Age
An
nu
al
 h
ou
rs
 o
f w
or
k
Male domestic + cc hours
Male domestic hours
Female domestic + cc hours
Female domestic hours
 
Figure 4b:  UK - domestic work and child care hours
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Figure 4c:  Germany - domestic hours and child care
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
<30 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
Age
A
nn
ua
l h
ou
rs
 o
f w
or
k
Male domestic + cc hours
Male domestic hours
Female domestic + cc
hours
 
The profiles of total time allocated to work in the market and at home exhibit an inverted 
U-shape. Thus if we subtract hours of work from the time constraint, we obtain a U-
 20
shaped profile of leisure for both partners, due to higher hours of work during the child-
rearing years. 
 
(ii) Time Allocation by Life Cycle Phase 
 
Again, as in Table 2, averaging across women who have children and those who have not 
conceals the full effect of children on female labour supply.  Here, however, rather than 
splitting the sample for each country into couples with and without children and 
presenting separate age profiles as in Table 3, we partition the sample for each country 
into life cycle phases defined on the presence and age of children, and on criteria that 
capture the later transition of their parents from work to retirement.  We also differentiate 
between younger women who are unlikely to have had children and older women whose 
children may have left home.  Thus, we split the sample into the following mutually 
exclusive phases: 
• Phase 1: couples of child-bearing age who do not yet have children; 
• Phase 2: couples with children of pre-school age; 
• Phase 3: couples with children of primary school age; 
• Phase 4: couples with children predominantly in the age range 13-15;  
• Phase 5: couples with children aged 15 and over and living at home; 
• Phase 6: couples of working age where the children have left home; 
• Phase 7: couples approaching retirement age; 
• Phase 8: couples of retirement age. 
 
Phase 1 contains couples with no dependent children and the female partner is aged under 
40 years. Phase 2 represents families with children under 5 and no teenage children 
present. Phase 3 families have at least one child aged 5 to 9 years. In phase 4 the children 
are predominantly in the 12 to 14 year age group. In phase 5 families have high school 
and older dependent children still living at home. There are no children present in phases 
6 to 8. Phase 6 is defined to include couples in which a partner is aged under 55 years or 
the male partner is under 60 and has a significant workforce attachment. Phase 7 is pre-
retirement, and represents couples in which the male partner is aged under 65, or at least 
one partner is not fully retired. In phase 8 both partners are retired.   
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Table 6 and Figure 5 present the profiles of market and domestic hours of work, and full 
time employment rates, defined on these phases.  On the arrival of children, in the move 
between phases 1 and 2, female labour supply and the percentage of women employed 
full time fall far more dramatically than in the preceding tables, while the proportion of 
women who supply no labour rises sharply, in all three countries.  Female domestic hours 
of work more than triple, male domestic hours more than double, and both partners have 
a substantial reduction in leisure time in the early child rearing phases.  
 
Table 6:  Life cycle labour supplies and employment rates of couples 
Life 
cycle 
phase 
Female  
Market 
hours 
 
FT % 
Male 
market 
hours 
 
FT % 
Female 
Domestic 
hours 
Male 
Domestic 
hours 
 
# 
deps 
 
Cell 
size 
Australia 
1 1789 69.5 2379 90.7 983 596 - 213 
2 535 21.8 2278 88.9 3548 1571 1.66 229 
3 745 17.7 2258 83.4 3185 1491 2.22 256 
4 861 27.4 2304 85.3 2724 1307 2.28 242 
5 1192 37.8 2209 81.1 1777 866 1.75 253 
6 1112 39.1 2166 41.5 15932 831 - 233 
7 509 17.2 1123 43.2 1801 1116 - 290 
8 46 1.1 152 5.1 1720 1380 - 276 
UK 
1 1842 75.4 2227 90.1 1032 673 - 259 
2 722 19.0 2335 89.8 2974 1351 1.56 257 
3 973 22.7 2262 91.0 2604 1263 2.10 285 
4 1174 27.7 2274 87.5 2185 1001 2.28 255 
5 1349 44.7 2018 83.6 1554 940 1.40 289 
6 1388 45.9 2055 83.3 1394 764 - 363 
7 676 20.1 1183 44.0 1681 1076 - 368 
8 50 1.8 99 2.6 1756 1357 - 390 
Germany 
1 1932 70.3 2277 78.0 1612 713 - 278 
2 673 18.9 2588 88.2 4887 1853 1.65 473 
3 957 27.1 2614 90.7 4199 1724 2.11 426 
4 1233 34.4 2681 92.9 3157 1252 1.82 425 
5 1356 40.5 2534 87.1 2293 768 1.37 428 
6 1604 54.5 2418 82.6 1763 611 - 499 
7 843 25.4 1246 42.9 1855 650 - 625 
8 180 4.9 81 1.9 1879 745 - 667 
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Figure 5a:  Australia - labour supply of couples
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Figure 5b:  UK - labour supply of couples 
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Figure 5c: Germany - labour supply of couples
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In all three countries, male market hours and full time employment change very little 
until the pre-retirement age. As the children reach school age and beyond, female market 
hours gradually increase and domestic hours fall, and leisure also increases. The female 
full-time employment rate rises steadily over these phases, but remains far below the 
male rate.  In both the UK and Australia, female market hours and female full time 
employment are much higher in phase 1 than at any later phase.      
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 (iii) Life cycle Income and Taxes 
 
The impact of children on the allocation of female time may obviously have, as an 
important corollary, significant effects on household income.  Again, these can be 
somewhat masked when we take the conventional definition of the life cycle in terms of 
male partner’s age, because of the averaging over households with very different 
compositions, but emerge very sharply when we adopt the phase definition above.  
 
Drawing on data for matching samples of couples from ABS 1997 Household 
Expenditure Survey (HES) and the 2000-01 UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES), Table 
7 presents life cycle profiles of household private income,16 female earnings, net 
household income, and taxes and benefits for Australia and the UK.17  The profiles show 
the large drop in female earnings and, in turn, in household private income that 
accompanies the switch of female time from the market to the household, from phase 1 to 
phase 2.18  In Australia, household private income falls by over 25 per cent, due to a drop 
in female earnings of almost two-thirds. The fall in net income is less, at around 20 per 
cent, due to family cash benefits, which have the effect of reducing direct taxes net of 
cash benefits by almost 50 per cent from phase 1 to phase 2. In the UK household private 
income falls by a little over 21 per cent, due to a fall in female earnings of over 50 per 
cent, and direct taxes net of cash benefits fall by over 40 per cent.  In both countries, 
private household income tends to recover in the later phases with the rise in female 
employment and earnings as the children grow up.     
 
The ABS HES 1998 provides detailed estimates of indirect taxes and indirect benefits, 
which allow the computation of an overall profile of all taxes net of benefits.19  It is 
striking that in phases 3 and 4, when the children are at school, education and child care 
                                                          
16 Private income is defined as income from all non-government sources such as wages and salaries, profits, 
investment income and superannuation.   
17 Results for Germany are omitted due to data limitations.  
18 The fall in household income following the arrival of children is missed in UK studies that define the life 
cycle solely on the age of head of household.  See, for example, Blundell el al (1994).     
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benefits significantly exceed taxes paid, and even in phase 5, when the children are in 
their teens and many have left home, the excess of taxes over benefits is small. However 
in phase 2, there is a substantial excess of taxes over benefits.20 This is due to a very low 
level of spending on child care and education for children under school age.  
 
       Table 7:  Life cycle incomes, earnings, taxes and benefits  
Life cycle 
phase 
Household 
private income 
Female 
earnings 
Household 
net income 
Direct taxes 
less benefits 
All taxes less 
all benefits 
Cell 
size 
Australia AUD$1998  
1 66353 27589 50890 15463 16208 449 
2 48720 9846 40894 7826 2569 508 
3 51605 12367 43643 7962 -2841 512 
4 54103 14137 46601 7503 -6081 516 
5 69547 18548 56594 12953 573 518 
6 63391 16867 50613 12778 13335 538 
7 38597 9608 35594 3003 820 531 
8 13291 574 22243 -8951 -17730 546 
All 49537 13247 42763 6774 303 4118 
UK  GB£2000  
1 38169 14756 29800 8370 - 354 
2 29942 6935 25101 4842 - 342 
3 31327 6711 27074 4253 - 338 
4 31974 7826 27622 4352 - 349 
5 35319 8914 30229 5091 - 346 
6 33125 9347 27249 5876 - 484 
7 18088 3587 19293 -1205 - 513 
8 11196 851 16452 -5256 - 638 
All 27478 7032 24680 2799 - 3900 
 
 
Overall, we can see that the effects of government policy, whether intended or not, are to 
transfer income predominantly from phases 1 and 6 to phases 3, 4 and 8. It is arguable 
that the time of the household’s greatest need, when gross market income is lowest and 
the adults are, in terms of both household and market labour supply, working their 
hardest, is phase 2, which receives relatively little net support. It is interesting to 
speculate on the extent to which this may play a part in the fertility decline and its 
differential impact across countries. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 The HES estimates of indirect government benefits cover non-cash benefits and services for education, 
health, housing and social security and welfare. 
20 The excess would be considerably greater if indirect health benefits associated with childbirth were 
excluded.   
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 V Across-Household Heterogeneity 
 
(i)  Labour Supply and Heterogeneity 
 
A striking feature of the data on female labour supply is the large degree of variation 
across households in female hours worked, after controlling for wage rates and 
demographics.  It is therefore interesting to present the data on life cycle time allocation, 
income, taxes and benefits differentiated by household type defined on the hours worked 
by the female partner. Ideally, we would like to differentiate between households in 
which female labour supply is just about zero, and those in which it is large, over the 
entire life cycle. This would however require panel data. Since we only have cross-
section data, we present life cycle profiles for a sample of households partitioned into two 
groups of equal size, according to the female partner’s usual hours of work.  The sample 
is selected on the criterion that the male partner is employed in phases 1 to 7.  “Type I” 
consists of households in which the female partner is a non-participant or supplies very 
little market labour. “Type II” are those in which she is employed full time or works 
relatively long part time hours.21 We do not split phase 1, since significant heterogeneity 
appears only after the arrival of children, nor do we split phase 8, in which few 
households are employed.  
 
Table 8 shows the high degree of polarisation of female labour supply across phases 2 to 
6, reflecting the fact that in the majority of Type I households the female partner is a non- 
participant or has minimal market hours, and in Type II households a large proportion is 
employed full time. Figure 6 depicts the profiles graphically.  As we would expect, 
females in Type I households supply significantly more time to household production 
than those in Type II households across these phases. However, the difference is well 
below the market labour supply of the latter, and so overall women in the Type II 
household are working longer hours and consuming significantly less leisure. They are 
                                                          
21 In presenting life cycle profiles for these types we are assuming that transitions between types over time 
do not invalidate our results.  In other words, we are assuming that “persistence” dominates. For evidence 
in support this hypothesis, see Shaw (1994).  
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also working longer hours than their male partners in all three countries.  The profiles of 
male market hours tend to be similar across both types of households, although there are 
differences across countries. 
 
 
Table 8:     Labour supply and domestic work by household type 
Female hours of work Male hours of workH’hold 
Type 
Life cycle 
phase Market Domestic Total Market Domestic Total 
 
# kids 
Australia 
 2 23 3953 3976 2495 1369 3864 1.74 
 3 91 3646 3737 2535 1258 3793 2.33 
I 4 230 3125 3355 2605 1102 3707 2.17 
 5 454 2393 2847 2403 817 3220 1.72 
 6 616 1846 2462 2427 755 3182 - 
 2 1132 2908 4040 2357 1571 3928 1.53 
 3 1536 2679 4215 2439 1497 3936 2.05 
II 4 1640 2285 3925 2518 1225 3743 1.96 
 5 1993 1753 3746 2627 856 3483 1.72 
 6 1915 1568 3483 2569 858 3427 - 
UK 
 2 197 3397 3594 2405 1325 3730 1.56 
 3 466 3091 3558 2447 1145 3592 2.63 
I 4 615 2502 3117 2399 914 3314 2.17 
 5 961 1739 2701 2254 850 3104 1.85 
 6 824 1606 2430 2292 732 3024 - 
 2 1348 2589 3937 2337 1428 3765 1.28 
 3 1573 2223 3700 2223 1432 3655 2.02 
II 4 1888 1778 3666 2478 1033 3511 2.00 
 5 1866 1393 3258 2215 963 3178 1.70 
 6 2016 1176 3192 2430 677 3107 - 
Germany 
 2 0 5063 5063 2861 1523 4384 1.37 
 3 5 4844 4849 2770 1430 4200 2.27 
I 4 287 3715 4002 2810 1234 4044 1.82 
 5 288 2842 3130 2785 671 3456 1.64 
 6 619 2094 2713 2713 552 3265 - 
 2 1126 3911 5130 2699 1692 4459 1.28 
 3 1891 3258 5149 2794 1728 4391 1.91 
II 4 2195 2650 4845 2814 1370 4148 1.55 
 5 2365 2039 4401 2811 847 3658 1.49 
 6 2593 1661 4254 2845 682 3527 - 
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Figure 6a:  Australia - labour supply by household type 
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Figure 6b:  UK - labour supply by household type 
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Figure 6c:  Germany - labour supply by household type 
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Table 9 presents income and tax profiles by household type, using the ABS HES and UK 
FES data.  Male earnings are quite similar across household types, which, since working 
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hours are also similar, suggests there is little variation in average male wage rates across 
types. The substantial differences in household private incomes by household type are 
due to female earnings, as we would expect. The interesting point is that the effect of the 
tax-benefit system is to bring about much smaller differences in household net income 
across types. Moreover, we see that Type II households are still major net contributors to 
taxation in phase 2, as well as in all other phases.  Type I households on the other hand 
benefit considerably in all phases in which there are children present in the household, 
although the difference declines in later phases in the UK, possibly because, unlike 
Australia, not all benefits are withdrawn on joint income or the income of the second 
earner. 
 
Table 9 Incomes and taxes by household type  
 
H’hold 
type 
Life 
cycle 
phase 
Household 
private 
income 
 
Female 
earnings 
 
Household 
net income 
Direct 
taxes less 
benefits 
All taxes 
less all 
benefits 
Australia   AUS$1998 
 2 43074 426 36719 6355 710 
 3 47713 2759 40344 7369 -3639 
I 4 51685 6530 44167 7518 -6810 
 5 66753 9197 59013 12741 209 
 6 64264 6279 50559 13705 14474 
 2 63667 21905 50127 13540 9619 
 3 68410 25314 53613 14797 5561 
II 4 69766 26094 55443 14323 3272 
 5 88160 31053 67965 20195 9393 
 6 77901 30452 59748 18154 19844 
UK GB£2000 
 2 26973 1909 22347 4626 - 
 3 28297 1500 24098 4199 - 
I 4 30032 3411 24881 5151 - 
 5 36239 3263 29310 6929 - 
 6 33632 2928 26784 6848 - 
 2 39656 12357 31729 7927 - 
 3 40441 13806 32171 8270 - 
II 4 40868 15638 32727 8141 - 
 5 44854 16170 35291 9563 - 
 6 40049 16015 31085 8964 - 
  
 
Note that differences in the average numbers of children by household type are relatively 
small in each phase, especially in the case of Australia, and therefore cannot offer an 
adequate explanation for the much higher taxation of the Type II household, although it is 
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clearly a contributing factor in some phases, especially in the UK. The main cause of the 
large gap between direct taxes, net of benefits, is the withdrawal of family assistance 
and/or tax credits on the basis of joint incomes.  Effective average tax rates on the 
incomes of second earners in Australian families with dependent children are now in the 
order of 30 to 40 per cent across the distribution of the primary income, with the highest 
rates applying towards the lower end of the distribution.  In both countries, we can see 
that the net effect of shifting towards a tax-benefit system designed to tax second earners 
at high effective rates is to bring about a substantial redistribution of income from Type II 
to Type I households, which cannot be justified in terms of family size or male earning 
capacity.  A similar result can be expected to hold for Germany, given its system of joint 
taxation. 
 
VI  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Our analysis of the data in the previous two sections suggests to us three points for 
further discussion, each of which is relevant for public policy.  
 
(i)  Female Labour Supply and Fertility Decline 
 
The aggregate data examined in Table 1 suggested a negative correlation between fertility 
and female labour supply within countries over time. This would seem to bear out the 
simple intuition that market work and child care are substitutes, as well as confirming 
more sophisticated models of economic growth and fertility.22 However, when we 
compare the data for Type I and Type II households, we see that there are relatively 
small, if statistically significant, differences in family size, although there are very large 
differences in female labour supply. If households in which the woman quits work when 
children arrive have only slightly more children on average than those in which she goes 
on working close to full time, how can growth in female labour supply explain fertility 
decline?  
 
                                                          
22 See for example Galor and Weil (1996) 
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One possible answer to that puzzle is provided by the life cycle perspective emphasised 
in this paper. Once the children reach school age there is a steady rate of return to the 
labour force, which increases as the children get older. Thus, even women who do not 
work when the children are small may well be anticipating a return to the labour force 
later, and as a result limit their family size. In that case the choice of family size is still 
restricted by the perceived possibilities of combining family and market work, and we 
would expect that a policy-induced improvement in these possibilities would increase 
both family size and the rate of re-entry to the labour force. It would also tend to increase 
family size among women who choose to go on working in the early phases. 
 
(ii)  Phase 2: The Impact of Children 
 
We view the time allocations we have considered in this paper as the outcomes of 
rational choices couples make, in the light of values of exogenous variables - wage rates, 
job characteristics,23 interest rates, availability of unsecured credit, price and availability 
of good quality child care, expectations of future wages and job opportunities, tax rates, 
government benefits - that they face. A striking feature of the data is the change in female 
time allocation between phases 1 and 2, and the resulting fall in household income and 
leisure of both partners. In terms of income level and total hours worked, phase 2 is the 
hardest time of the couple’s life.  
 
We would argue that such an abrupt and costly reallocation is the result of two kinds of 
market failure. First, there is a failure in the child care market to provide affordable child 
care of sufficiently high quality, hence it is rational for the female partner to reallocate 
her time from labour market to household, since she typically faces a lower wage, and for 
both partners to forego leisure, since the shadow price of household production has 
increased. There are two sources of market failure here. There is a non-convexity arising 
from economies of scale in the provision of child care. Child care has the typical 
characteristics of a local public good. Secondly there is a huge tax distortion: market 
child care must be bought out of taxed income, and the main factor of production in child 
                                                          
23 For example working hours, flexibility. 
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care, labour, is also heavily taxed. Therefore there is a large gap between the marginal 
value product and the marginal social cost of child care. For both these reasons, there is a 
strong case for public intervention in the supply of child care. 
 
Secondly, there is a capital market failure. Couples who want to maintain their 
consumption standard and buy in child care face the problem that the interest rate on non-
collateralised borrowing, such as bank overdrafts, credit cards and consumer credit, is 
high and rising with the amount borrowed. A rational response therefore is to work 
harder and cut consumption and saving in this phase of the life cycle. We can regard 
government provision of benefits for older children, in phases 3 to 5, as to some extent 
compensating for this capital market failure, particularly in the provision of education. As 
we have seen however, this does not extend to phase 2.  Instead, a mother who opts to 
remain at work in this phase may find that her net-of-tax income is not sufficient to cover 
the cost of private sector child care,24 even in cases where she qualifies for a child care 
benefit.  Under these conditions it is not surprising to observe a dramatic decline in 
female labour supply after the arrival of children and a high degree of heterogeneity in 
female hours across seemingly identical families, who are making different assessments 
of the gains and losses associated with the choice between working at home and in the 
market. 
  
(iii)  Heterogeneity of Female Labour Supply 
 
We have seen that family demographics and the male partner’s wage do not differ 
sufficiently to provide an explanation for the observed large degree of heterogeneity in 
female labour supply.  Clearly, as noted, varying assessments of the risk associated with 
future net-of-tax earnings and the ease with which a woman can become re-employed 
                                                          
24 The limitations of a privatised, for-profit child care sector employing low-skilled labour become obvious 
when we consider the impact that government support, centralised planning and regulation have had on 
ensuring that children after age 4 have access to an affordable primary school education from trained 
teachers.    
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after a spell out of the labour market,25 are contributing factors.  In addition, we would 
expect productivity in household production and the price and availability of quality child 
care to be important determinants of variations in female labour supply.  
 
The explanation of the across-household variation in female labour supply is central to 
the evaluation of tax and benefit policies. As we have seen, existing policies imply 
substantial redistributions from households with high, to households with low female 
labour supply. This will always be characteristic of tax and transfer systems that are 
based on household market income. The extent to which this represents on balance a 
socially desirable redistribution, especially when the efficiency effects are taken into 
account, depends on the relationship between household utility possibilities and market 
income. Holding constant the female wage, re-employment possibilities and price and 
availability of child care, if female labour supply is inversely associated with productivity 
in household production, as would be the case for example if women worked where they 
had a comparative productivity advantage, then along this dimension there is a negative 
correlation between female labour supply and market income, on the one side, and 
household utility possibilities on the other. Thus the observed redistribution could be 
regressive. More generally, we would need to know much more about the determinants of 
female labour supply to be able to assess the equity implications of the existing 
tax/transfer system and to be able to set these against the efficiency costs. Needless to 
say, existing systems presuppose an answer to this question. 
 
(iv)  Conclusion 
 
Three decades ago, Germany and the UK on the one hand, and Australia on the other, 
were regarded as having fundamentally different tax and social security contribution 
systems. Germany had, and still has, a system of joint taxation or income splitting, which 
essentially equalizes marginal tax rates of husband and wife, with the result that a family 
in which the mother works in the market rather than at home faces a higher effective tax 
                                                          
25 This will depend on the rate of human capital depreciation when out of the labour market, and of course, 
if anticipated, can have an important effect ex ante, on the decision whether to go on working when the 
children are young, as well as ex post. For more on this, see Attanasio et al (2003). 
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rate.  Australia had, from the outset, independent taxation and the UK switched to 
independent taxation in 1990. Under this system the marginal tax rate depended only on 
the income of the individual. Since the early 1980’s, as a result of introducing a system of 
family benefits based on joint income, the Australian system has become more like that 
of Germany, but with a difference: the highest marginal rates can now apply to average 
family incomes.  The UK is in the process of moving in a similar direction, with the 
introduction of working family tax credits.  The three countries are also not dissimilar in 
having rather poor systems of child care. It is not therefore too surprising that all three 
countries have similar profiles, as reported in this paper. It would be interesting to extend 
the approach of this paper to the Scandinavian countries and France, where the tax and/or 
the child care systems would be expected to produce substantially different results.   
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